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Rethinking Consideration in the Electronic Age 
 
Robert A. Hillman* & Maureen A. O’Rourke**
 
Abstract 
 
 Our fast-paced age of electronic agreements that ostensibly govern transactions as diverse 
as downloading software, ordering goods, and engaging in collaborative development projects  
raises questions regarding the suitability of contract law as the appropriate legal framework.  
While this question arises in many settings , we focus here on the free and open source software 
(FOSS) movement because of the maturity and success of its model and the ubiquity of its 
software.  We explore in particular whether open source licenses are supported by consideration, 
and argue that they are, and that open source licenses are contracts.  We further argue that a 
contractual framework working in tandem with the intellectual property laws is the appropriate 
legal structure to govern FOSS transactions.  Our discussion holds implications for the 
understanding of consideration doctrine and contract law generally outside of the FOSS example 
and, indeed, for collaborative development and electronic agreements generally. The article is 
thus an exercise in understanding consideration doctrine's past and future. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
          The age of electronic communication and digital products creates new challenges for 
contract law.  Novel methods of doing business and new kinds of products raise substantial 
issues of contract formation, enforcement, and remedy.  Because of the importance to our 
economy of the industries involved, perhaps no other set of commercial legal issues requires 
greater attention.1  
 
 
*  Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
**  Dean, Professor of Law & Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University 
School of Law.  The authors thank Sapna Kumar and Robert Gomulkiewicz for their help and 
note they do not necessarily agree with us.  We also thank Mark Grube for excellent research 
assistance. 
1 See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005 Service Annual Survey: Information Sector 
Services, Table 3.1.6, available at 
http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/services/sas/sas_NAICS51.pdf (listing the operating revenue 
of the United States software industry as over 119 billion in 2005). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352427
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 Indeed, one important set of issues is whether some transactions are or should be 
encompassed within a contractual framework at all.2  For example, what is the appropriate legal 
framework to govern the licensing of open source software that is collaboratively developed and 
powers ever more machines?3  Steven Weber aptly captures the nature of the open source 
software movement: 
 
Open source collaboration depends on an explicitly intellectual property regime, codified 
in a series of licenses.  It is, however, a regime built around a set of assumptions and 
goals that are different from those of mainstream intellectual property rights thinking.  
The principal goal of the open source intellectual property regime is to maximize the 
ongoing use, growth, development and distribution of free software.  To achieve that 
goal, this regime shifts the fundamental optic of intellectual property rights away from 
 
2 Compare Jose J. Gonzalez de Alaiza Cardona, Open Source, Free Software, and 
Contractual Issues, 15 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 157, 185-209 (2007) (arguing generally that the 
Free Software Foundation’s (FSF’s) General Public License (GPL) is a contract) with Sapna 
Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 1 J. L. Tech. & Pol’y 1, 16 (2006) (arguing that the GPL lacks 
consideration and should be “properly characterized as a failed contract”). For discussions of 
related issues, see Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 451 (2005); Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: 
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 Rutgers L.J. 53 (2004); Michael J. Madison, 
Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 275 (2003); David McGowan, Legal 
Implications of Open Source Software, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241; Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating 
Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software 
Licenses, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 11 (2000). 
 
3  For a discussion of the nature of source code, see Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on 
Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open Source Software, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. 
L. 45, 49 (2006): 
 
“Software developers write software in various programming languages . . . .  The 
original format they write is called source code, which is easy for trained programmers to 
read and understand.  This source code has to be compiled or translated into an object 
code . . . before it can be processed by a computer. . . .  Source code enables users to 
extend or modify the software for their own needs, while object code is understood only 
by computers. 
 
‘Open source software’ is software, the source and object code of which are 
distributed and made available to the public allowing for free modification by other 
programmers.  In contrast most commercial software is proprietary software, and is 
distributed only with the object code so that competitors are prevented from reusing the 
course code to develop the software. 
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protecting the prerogatives of an author toward protecting the prerogatives of generations 
of users.4    
 
 Although there are many different open source licenses, the General Public License 
(GPL) is likely the most common.5  To achieve the goal of creating a software commons, the 
GPL authorizes copyholders to transfer, copy, or modify the software subject to a series of 
restrictions.  The restrictions are designed to further an environment of openness by requiring 
copyholders to reveal the source code to transferees of any software products that are derived 
from the original source code (often referred to as the “copyleft” provision)6 and to transfer such 
software under the same terms as the GPL (“same terms” provision), making the terms 
themselves “viral” in nature.7
 
 Historically, some open source vendors and enthusiasts insisted that such arrangements 
were merely limited licenses to use the software and not contracts in part because they do not 
require the copyholder to furnish consideration to support the grant of use.8  If the user violated 
the restrictions in the license, licensors could seek redress in an intellectual property 
infringement proceeding, but not for breach of contract.  The advantages of this legal framework 
perceived by these advocates include the absence of worrisome formation, liability, privity, and 
remedial rules of contract law and the availability of injunctive relief under intellectual property 
law.9  Perhaps even more important, open source visionaries believe their arrangements create a 
new framework of sharing and openness that is impervious to and on a higher plane than contract 
law.10  On the other hand, others maintain, although without much analysis, that the typical open 
source license, such as the GPL, constitutes a contract because of the nature of the restrictions 
and other provisions in the license.11   
 
 We show in some detail that open source licenses that contain restrictions such as the 
copyleft and the “same terms” restrictions described above do not lack consideration, and are 
 
4  Steven Weber, The Success of Open Source 84 (2004). 
5 See infra notes , and accompanying text. 
6  See generally Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the 
Digital Age, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1487 (1997). 
7 Weber, supra note 4, at 49. 
8  See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: Enforcing the GPL, 
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/lu-12.html. 
9  See infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
10  See generally Weber, supra note 4. 
11  See infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
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therefore not precluded from treatment as contracts on that ground.12  More important, we assert 
that contract law should govern these transactions because contract law best facilitates the goals 
of the open source movement while at the same time protecting the interests of open source end 
users.  Indeed, contract working with copyright law perhaps best enables the open source 
movement to realize its goals than reliance on copyright law alone. 
 
 But as the title to this article suggests, we have another important goal beyond analyzing 
the legal framework of the open source movement.  This article illuminates the meaning and role 
of the consideration doctrine as we move from a paper into an electronic world.  Consideration 
doctrine has always been something of a mystery and working out how it does or does not apply 
in the open source software setting increases our understanding of how the principle has and 
should continue to serve society.  The article is thus an exercise in understanding where 
consideration doctrine has been and where it is going.  
 
 We demonstrate that the purpose of consideration doctrine is to enforce promises that 
benefit society (viewed broadly) and that are capable of judicial administration.  Under this 
pragmatic framework, open source software transactions can and should be administered as 
contracts because of their economic importance and because of the judiciary’s ability to 
administer them.  Further, because contract law clarifies formation requirements, quality 
obligations, and remedial duties of open source transactions, and generally increases 
transactional certainty, both providers and end users of open source software have an interest in 
establishing a contractual framework for their transactions. These conclusions have implications 
beyond the software industry and shed light on the appropriate legal landscape for other 
movements employing the philosophy of openness.13
 
 Part I constitutes a brief primer on the bargain theory of consideration as courts apply it 
in the paper world.  Part II discusses the open source software movement and concludes that 
open source licenses are contracts under an appropriate understanding of consideration doctrine.  
Part III makes the normative argument that a contract-based framework makes sense for the open 
source community.  Our conclusion reiterates our view that contract law, working with 
intellectual property law, is the appropriate legal structure to govern most open source software 
transactions. 
     
I.  The Bargain Theory of Consideration14
 
 
12  Other terms that constitute consideration, according to advocates of the contract 
model, include those that require the licensee to waive any infringement claim or breach of 
warranty complaint. 
13  See infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
14  Much of the discussion in Part I is based on Robert A. Hillman, Principles of Contract 
Law 15-37 (2004).  
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 A.  The Meaning of “Bargain” 
 
 As the Introduction discusses, an important issue in the electronic age is whether, as a 
descriptive matter, an open source software license constitutes a contract.  The argument focuses 
on whether consideration supports the distribution of open source software.  So we start with a 
brief primer on the consideration doctrine under traditional contract law.15    
 
 1.  Definitions 
  
 In a nutshell, contract law enforces promises if the promise is part of a “bargained-for 
exchange” or “bargain.” A bargain exists if the promisor extracts something from the promisee 
in exchange for the promise.  This price of the promise is called  “consideration.” Contract law 
distinguishes a promise supported by consideration from a gift promise, which is not 
enforceable.16
 
   The following example illustrates: 
 
Suppose a “benevolent” person, Ron D. Jockefeller,  promises to buy clothes for a 
homeless person if the homeless person walks to a clothing store a few blocks away.  If 
the homeless person walks to the store, is Jockefeller’s promise of the clothes 
enforceable?17  Only if Jockefeller “bargained for” the homeless person to walk to the 
store, which in turn depends on whether Jockefeller’s motive was to extract the walk as 
the price of the promise of clothes.  But in order to understand Jockefeller’s motive, we 
need more facts.  Suppose Jockefeller owned a restaurant and the homeless person had 
camped out in front of the restaurant.  These facts support a finding that Jockefeller’s 
motive for his promise was to remove the homeless person from the vicinity of the 
restaurant and we can therefore say that Jockefeller “bargained for” the homeless 
person’s walk to the clothing store.  But if Jockefeller did not own a restaurant and made 
the promise, not because he would get something in return, but simply because he is a 
wonderful person, the promise would constitute a gift promise and be unenforceable.  
The homeless person still must walk to the store to pick up the gift.  But those in the 
 
15  See id.  
16  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2(1) (1981) (“A promise is a manifestation of 
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.”); id. at § 3 (“A bargain is an agreement to 
exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”). 
17  This example was inspired by a similar problem posed by Williston in 1 Samuel 
Williston, The Law of Contracts 232-33 (1924), quoted in Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242, 243 
(Va. 1931).                        . 
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know say that the trip to the store is a condition necessary to pick up a gift, not 
consideration to support Jockefeller’s promise.18
 
 
 Of course, distinguishing a condition of a gift from consideration often is no small 
challenge.19  In Cardozo’s famous opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County 
Bank,20 for example, Mary Yates Johnston promised Allegheny College $5000 to establish the 
“the Mary Yates Johnston memorial fund.”21  After contributing $1000, Johnston repudiated her 
promise, which led to a lawsuit by the college.  Judge Cardozo held that the college assumed a 
duty “to perpetuate the name of the founder of the memorial,” which was “sufficient in itself to 
give validity to the subscription within the rules that define consideration for a promise of that 
order.”22  However, the dissent thought that “[t]he sum offered was termed a ‘gift’ by [Johnston].  
Consequently, I can see no reason why we should strain ourselves to make it, not a gift, but a 
trade.”23  In short, the majority and dissent disagreed over Johnston’s motive–was the use of her 
name the price of her promise or did she simply want to make a gift, with the suggestion that the 
college use her name.  Both interpretations seem reasonable. 
 
 By drawing on the murky gift versus consideration distinction, contract law leaves plenty 
of room for courts to decide whether to enforce promises for other reasons.  In short, Cardozo’s 
conclusion likely was motivated more by his sense of the importance of facilitating charitable 
donations than on the strictures of consideration doctrine.    
 
 2.  More on the promisor’s motive  So far, the discussion illustrates that traditional 
contract law’s “bargain” concept focuses on the promisor’s motive for making the promise and 
that this determination is often a challenge.  Adding further to the confusion, the promisor’s 
actual motive does not control, but what a reasonable person with knowledge of the 
circumstances would believe is the promisor’s motive.24   This is consistent with contract law’s 
 
18  Hillman, supra note , at 16; see also Williston, supra note , at 232-33; Plowman v. 
Indian Refining Co., 20 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Ill. 1937) (employees obligation to visit employer’s 
office to pick up checks merely a condition for a gift). 
19  See infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
20  159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
21  Id. at 174. 
22  Id. at 176.    
23  Id. at 177. 
24  See Williston, supra note , at 232; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81, 
cmt. a: “[T]he promisor must manifest an intention to induce the performance or return promise 
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general focus on the apparent rather than subjective meaning of the parties’ language in 
negotiating and forming their contract.  Another wrinkle is that  a promisor’s motive to extract 
something from the promisee can be very minor among a host of reasons for making the promise 
(as determined objectively) and that motive can change over time.  Receiving something in 
return “does not have to be the primary or even a substantial reason for making the promise, it 
simply has to be one of the reasons.”25  This manoeuver, of course, affords courts even more 
leeway to manipulate consideration doctrine and to decide on other grounds. 
 
  B.  Why Not Enforce Gift Promises? 
 
 Theorists have spilled a great deal of ink trying to understand why contract law generally 
enforces bargains but not gift promises.  Why is my “bargain” to sell my piano to Alice in 
exchange for $400 enforceable, but my promise to give Alice my piano is not?26  Before 
enforcing a promise, why bother to determine whether one of a potential host of reasons for 
making a promise, viewed objectively, was to extract something from the promisee?  
 
 Contract law analysts have offered many disparate answers to this question.  Professor 
Lon Fuller’s set of explanations is perhaps the most prominent, arguably the most persuasive 
and, although sometimes recast in different terminology, the most repeated.  Nevertheless, even 
Fuller’s reasons leave much open to debate.   
 
 In Consideration and Form,27 Professor Fuller presented what he called “formal” and 
“substantive” reasons for enforcing promises supported by consideration, but not gift promises.  
In the “formal” reason category, Fuller thought that, as a general matter, promises supported by 
 
and to be induced by it, and . . . the promisee must manifest an intention to induce the making of 
the promise and to be induced by it.” (Emphasis added). 
25  Hillman, supra note , at 18.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 81 (“The fact that 
what is bargained for does not of itself induce the making of a promise does not prevent it from 
being consideration for the promise.”); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank 
of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
26   For further obfuscation see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:  “A gift is not 
ordinarily treated as a bargain, and a promise to make a gift is not made a bargain by the promise 
of the prospective donee to accept the gift, or by his acceptance of part of it.  This may be true 
even though the terms of the gift impose a burden on the donee as well as the donor.”  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §71, cmt. c (emphasis added).  The best explanation for this 
language is that some burdens constitute only what is necessary to complete a gift.  For example,  
a donee who must travel to a store to receive a gift experiences the burden of the travel, but the 
travel ordinarily would not constitute consideration.  See supra notes ___ and accompanying 
text. 
27  Fuller, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941). 
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consideration generate more evidence than gift promises that a promisor actually made the 
promise.  Enforcing only bargains thus satisfies “[t]he need for evidentiary security.”28  Of 
course, contract law also could have enforced written gift promises, which would have satisfied 
Fuller’s “evidentiary function” as well.  The evidentiary role of consideration therefore cannot 
constitute a sufficient explanation for enforcing bargains and not gift promises. 
 
 Fuller explained further that people take their bargains more seriously than gift 
promises.29   He reasoned that people often make gift promises impulsively or improvidently.30  
As with Fuller’s “evidentiary” function, however, the “cautionary” role of consideration cannot 
fully explain the bargain requirement.  Enforcing written gift promises arguably also would serve 
the same purpose because most people believe that written promises are more important and 
serious.  In fact, many people believe such promises are already legally enforceable.31
 
 Fuller also set forth “substantive” explanations for the gift-consideration division that 
concern “the significance of the promise made and not merely the circumstances surrounding the 
making of it.”32  For example, Fuller thought that enforcing bargains enhances “private 
autonomy.” According to Fuller, “the law views private individuals as possessing a power to 
 
28  Id. at 800.  See also Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further 
Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 713,   (1996) (the 
requirement of a bargain avoids enforcement of  “too easily fabricated” gift promises.”).  
29  Fuller, supra note ,  at 816-17 (“[T]he fact that the transaction is an exchange and not a 
gift . . . does offer some guaranty so far as the cautionary . . . function[] of form [is] 
concerned.”). 
30  Think about the famous case of Dougherty v. Salt, in which Helena Dougherty 
promised her nephew, Charlie, $3000 because she wanted to “take care” of him.  The facts reveal 
that, before Helena’s promise, Charlie’s guardian told Helena not to “take . . . out in talk” her 
appreciation for her nephew.  125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919).  The court therefore declined to enforce 
Helena’s promise therefore because she was goaded into it.  Id. at   ; see also Wessman, supra 
note , at 835 (enforcing gift promises would lead to “inadvertent contracting.”). 
31  Fuller also discussed the “channeling” function of consideration.  In a nutshell, a 
bargain presents parties with a concrete procedure or a “distinct set of instructions” for creating 
an enforceable obligation.  Hillman, supra note , at 24.  Gift promises, according to Fuller, are 
“too amorphous to constitute clear instructions for creating a legal obligation.”  Id.  See Fuller, 
supra note , at 815 (“As to the channeling function . . . the [gift] promise is made in a field where 
intention is not naturally canalized.  There is nothing . . . to effect a neat division between 
tentative and exploratory expressions of intention, on the one hand, and legally effective 
transactions, on the other.”). But again, written gift promises would do much of the same 
“channeling” work as a bargain. 
32  Id. at 799-800 (substantive bases of contract liability relate to; see also id. at 806-14. 
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effect . . . changes in their legal relations” every bit as effective as a  legislature.33  In addition, 
people can rely on their bargains with the knowledge that contract law will enforce them.  
Further, where one party has relied in a manner that benefits the promisor, the reason for 
enforcing promises is strongest because one party’s detrimental reliance results in the other’s 
unjust enrichment.34
 
 Fuller’s substantive reasons for enforcing bargains thus far are of limited help in 
explaining why contract law enforces bargains but not gift promises.35  For example, contract 
law could enforce gift promises to facilitate people’s freedom to make and receive gifts.36  
Private autonomy therefore cannot be the primary reason for the distinction between gifts and 
bargains.  Fuller’s reliance and unjust enrichment arguments also fail to explain very well why 
contract law enforces bargains even if the promisee has not relied or conferred a benefit on the 
promisor.37   
 
 But Fuller offered one additional substantive argument for the distinction between 
bargains and gift promises that is more convincing.  He explained that gift promises, more than 
bargains, are likely to constitute “sterile transmissions,”38 meaning that gift promises add less 
than bargains to the “production of wealth and the division of labor.”39  In short, bargains better 
than gift promises contribute to a prosperous society by moving resources to their highest valued 
uses.40     
 
33  Id. at 806-08. 
34  Id. at 815-16. 
35  See Mark B.Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and 
Collaboration, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 9, 10 (2008) (“[T]he reasons commonly advanced in favor of 
enforcing bargain promises–the facilitation of exchange, the protection of expectations or 
reliance, or respect for autonomy–could also be mustered in support of the enforcement of 
promises traditionally classified as gratuitous.”). 
36  See Charles Fried, Contract As Promise 20 (1981). 
37  But see Fuller, supra note , at   (“to encourage reliance we must dispense with its 
proof.”). 
38  Id. at 815 (quoting Bufnoir, Propriété et Contrat 487 (2d ed. 1924)). 
39  Id. at 815.  See also Hillman, supra note , at 25. 
40  Melvin Eisenberg asserts that gift promises would lose their symbolic meaning if they 
were legally enforceable.  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of 
Gift, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 821, 849 (1997): 
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 Others have contributed additional reasons for the distinction between gift promises and 
bargains that nicely compliment Fuller’s.  Professor Melvin Eisenberg pointed out that courts 
lack the capacity to entertain the potential volume of cases that would flood the courts if people 
could sue for breach of gift promises.  Further, he underscored the difficulty of proving the 
deliberativeness of oral gift promises and the challenge of sorting out valid from invalid excuses 
for nonperformance of such promises.41  The cost of administering a gift-promise regime, in 
short, would likely exceed the benefit.42  In addition, even if Fuller were wrong about the 
contribution of gift promises to society because, for example, gift promises move resources 
voluntarily from more to less prosperous citizens, itself a socially beneficial outcome, legal 
enforcement of these promises might decrease their number.  Promisors might become wary of 
making gift promises if they thought that they could not change their minds.43
 
 In the next subsection we reenforce the argument that the value of bargains and the 
capacity of our institutions to administer them stand out as the most promising explanations for 
the consideration doctrine.   
 
 C.  Is the Bargain Theory Coherent? 
 
 The bargain theory is neither descriptively nor normatively very coherent.  As Professor 
Charles Fried pointed out and as the discussion above intimates, the theory leaves ample room 
 
The world of gift is a world of our better selves, in which affective values like 
love friendship, affection, gratitude, and comradeship are the prime motivating 
forces.  These values are too important to be enforced by law and would be 
undermined if the enforcement of simple, affective donative promises were to be 
mandated by the law.   
41  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1,   (1979); 
Eisernberg, supra note , at 823. 
42  Enforcing only written gift promises would alleviate some of these concerns.  See 
supra notes , and accompanying text. 
43  Wessman, supra note , at 13-16.  Still others have contributed enlightened 
explanations of the bargain-gift promise distinction.  See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond 
the Grave: Revisiting The Question of Consideration, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1876 (2001); Charles 
Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Harvard University Press 
1981); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Charles Goetz 
& Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises, An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L. J. 
1261 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. Legal Stud. 
411 (1977). 
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for courts to dodge issues and for theorists to ponder.44  Courts sometimes police the adequacy of 
consideration despite contract law’s freedom-of-contract norm to leave that issue to the parties.45  
Courts enforce gift promises that induce reliance or for a benefit already received despite the 
absence of a bargain.46  Courts enforce without consideration contract modifications, option 
contracts, waivers, and promises made to charitable institutions. Courts enforce promises even if 
the return consideration is only an ephemeral reason for making the promise.47  Courts 
manipulate or dispense with consideration if they believe a gift promise is important enough to 
enforce.48  Consideration to support a promise can come from a party other than the promisee.49  
Theorists offer conflicting moral, economic, and libertarian theories, among others, to “explain” 
promise enforcement.50  No wonder that Professor Grant Gilmore was moved to announce the 
wholesale demise of the bargain theory of consideration.51
 
 Notwithstanding Gilmore, we believe that the bargain theory survives as the best the law 
can do at line drawing between those promises that should be legally enforceable and those that 
should be left to the promisor’s “foro conscientiae.”52  Despite its malleability, consideration 
serves a minimal gatekeeper role, corralling the large category of gift promises in which the cost 
of enforcement outweighs the benefit.  Nevertheless, the bargain theory’s relative indeterminacy 
means that courts can enlarge the category of promises within its ranks if they believe the 
promise is important and enforcement is administratively feasible. 
 
 Two examples of the latter should suffice.  To preserve the flexibility of contracting 
parties in the face of changed circumstances, contract law saw the importance of enforcing 
contract modifications that are not supported by consideration.  Courts therefore devised mutual 
 
44  See Charles Fried, Contract As Promise 35 (1981); see also Randy Barnett, A Consent 
Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986); Wessman, Gatekeeper, supra note , at  
45  See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
46  Fried, supra note ,   at 25, 31-32. 
47  See supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
48  See the discussion of Allegheny College, supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
49  Consideration “may be given by the promisee or by some other person.”  Restatement 
(First) of Contracts 75(2) (1932). 
50  Robert A. Hillman, Richness of Contract Law (1997).    
51  Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 111 n. 34 (1974) (“Hamer v. Sidway . . . 
illustrates . . . that the New York Court of Appeals . . . rejected the so-called bargain theory of 
consideration.”) see also Barnett, supra note , at , 287-290.  
52  Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207 (1825). 
12 
 
                                                
rescission, waiver, and other theories within the framework of the consideration theory to allow 
for enforcement of such modifications.53  Similarly, contract law began to enforce promises not 
to revoke offers (option contracts) in the absence of consideration because of the importance of 
options to our economy:  “The fact that the option is an appropriate preliminary step in the 
conclusion of a socially useful transaction provides a sufficient substantive basis for enforcement 
. . . .”54
 In short, under the rubric of “consideration” twentieth-century courts enforced promises 
that increased society’s welfare, interpreted broadly, and that were capable of judicial 
administration.55  Lines were drawn, but courts could adjust them if necessary.  In Parts II and III 
of this paper, we argue respectively that open source licenses nicely fit in the category of 
agreements that consideration doctrine, as it is currently understood, encompasses.  Further, we 
argue that contract law should enforce such licenses as contracts. 
 
II.   The Paper World’s Conception of Contracts Includes Open Source Licenses 
 
 A.  The Nature of the Open Source Movement 
 
 The notion that sharing software might be a successful technical and business strategy 
began somewhat earlier than many might think.  In 1955, users of one of IBM’s early systems 
organized a user group called SHARE in which members exchanged ideas and software.56  IBM 
 
53  See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 680 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1700 (1976). 
54  Restatement (Second) of Contracts 87(1), cmt. (b); see also James D. Gordon III, 
Consideration and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 283, 292-96 (1991); 
David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing 
Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1299, 1315-21 (2006) 
(“Since option contracts and guarantee contracts are socially valuable in substance, any 
imperfections in form can be ignored.  Ironically, whereas these authorities normally prioritize 
substance over form, they are willing to accept form over substance for promises that they 
recognize as sufficiently valuable.”). 
55  See Wessman, supra note , at 14 (observing “the trend in modern contract law to 
enforce all commercial promises–even though some are technically gratuitous”). 
56 See About SHARE, 
http://www.share.org/AboutSHARE/Organization/tabid/66/Default.aspx, last visited Jan. 25, 
2009 (“In 1955, just two years after the release of IBM’s first computer, a handful of the earliest 
IT professionals collaborated to form SHARE.”); see also Mary Brandel, 1955: IBM Customers 
Form the First Computer User Group, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9905/05/1955.idg/index.html (“[SHARE’s] main purpose 
was to stop reinventing the wheel – at the time, all the 701 users were writing their own utilities 
and programs.  With the impending release of the 704, they faced the giant task of rewriting or 
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at the time distributed some source code with its hardware and encouraged the formation of the 
group because the more utilities that would run on IBM’s hardware, the more attractive its 
machines became.57  It did not view software as an independent revenue source in the same way 
that many firms do today.  
 
 Computer technology has of course changed dramatically since 1955 with the advent of 
mini-computers and later the PC.58  A mass market for software grew up in response, and 
vendors protected their software with a panoply of legal methods that made sharing not simply 
unlikely but potentially a breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, copyright 
infringement, and/or patent infringement.59  
 
 Most place the origin of what is now known as FOSS (free and open source software) not 
with SHARE but substantially later.  In the mid 1980s, Richard Stallman founded the Free 
Software Foundation (FSF) in part as a reaction against the rise of business models that relied on 
keeping source code proprietary and thus effectively inaccessible to those who wished to modify 
or otherwise improve on it and share their solutions with others.60  The acronym FOSS 
accommodates two visions of the open source movement.  Stallman’s FSF contends that 
ethically the copyright system is “inherently divisive and antisocial” while others in the open 
source community view software sharing as an important development model but compatible 
with proprietary software.61  Thus, for example, the FSF’s General Public License (GPL) 
 
porting all those programs to a new machine.  So from the very first meeting, the group began to 
share programming knowledge.”); W. David Gardner, SHARE, IBM User Group, To Celebrate 
50th Anniversary, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticleSrc.jhtml;jsessionid=GLPLF1IP4... 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2009) (“‘SHARE and its SHARE library invented the open source 
concept.’”). 
57 See (SHARE (computing), available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHARE_(computing) (“Originally, IBM’s operating systems were 
distributed in source form and it was common for systems programmers to make local 
modifications and to exchange them with other users.”). 
58 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Patenting 
Software 199-201, in Intellectual Property Stories (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, eds. 2006) & sources cited therein (summarizing the evolution of the industry and 
legal methods to protect software); Ravicher, supra note 2, at 9-15. 
59 See sources cited id.; see also O’Rourke, Toward Patenting Software, supra note , at 
203-18 (discussing the evolution of patent protection for software). 
60 See McGowan, supra note 2, at 260-61. 
61 Id. at 261-62; see also Stephen J. Davidson & Nathan Kumagai, Developments in the 
Open Source Community and the Impact of the Release of GPLv3 133-34, in PLI/PAT Open 
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contains provisions which require modification and redistribution of the code under terms that 
keep both the original code and derivative works thereof open, while other open source licenses 
allow access to source code but do not necessarily place conditions on modification or 
redistribution that would enforce the norm of openness.62   
 
 Open source software is developed in a dramatically different way than proprietary code.  
The open source development model is collaborative, with large numbers of participants ranging 
from professional programmers to hobbyists contributing to any particular effort.63  That this 
development model can be successful is beyond question.  Some of the most widely used, 
important and complex programs are open source, and many companies that traditionally 
advocated a proprietary model have embraced open source in one way or another.64
 
Source Software 2007: Risks, Rewards and Practical Realities in the Corporate Environment 
(noting the “two primary factions within the open source community” and describing them as the 
“‘free software movement’ [] a philosophical and social movement that aims to change the rights 
of software users [and] the ‘open source movement,’ which promotes the efficiency and better 
software development model of open source development, rather than moral or ethical ideals of 
freedom.”);  Gonzalez, supra note 2, at 183-84 (describing the free software movement and the 
Open Source Initiative: “[T]he free software movement justifies the freedoms to distribute and 
access the source code as a matter of social fairness. . . . [T]he Open Source Initiative agrees with 
the superiority of an open development process, but they consider it compatible with the 
commercial software companies, that is, with proprietary software.”). 
62 Gonzalez, supra note 2, at 184-85.  The major example of an open source license that 
does not require openness downstream is the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license.  Id. 
at 184; see also Weber, supra note 4, at 20-53 (chronicling the early history of open source 
software and discussing the BSD). 
63 See Douglas D. McGhee, Free and Open Source Software Licenses: Benefits, Risks, 
and Steps Toward Ensuring Compliance, 19 No. 11 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 5, 5 (2007) 
(“Instead of a small team of proprietary developers working on a software product, any 
programmer with access to the Internet can participate in the development of a FOSS project so 
long as they agree to make their work publicly available.  The hoped-for result of having many 
sets of eyes on a body of code is that the final result will be superior to what a small group of 
proprietary developers bound by confidentiality agreements can accomplish.”); see also Amy 
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 Yale L. J. 804, 822-25, 869 (2008) (noting that open source software “offers a 
model of collaborative, distributed innovation that does not rely on the incentivizing effect of IP 
rights.”)   
 
64 See Gonzalez, supra note 2, at 160-62 (listing some major open source packages 
including Apache, Firefox, and Linux, and noting that many large companies are supporting the 
open source movement); McGowan, supra note 2, at 256 (“[C]ollaborative OSS projects such as 
Linux and Apache demonstrate that a large and complex system of software codes can be built, 
maintained, developed, and extended in a non-proprietary setting where developers work in a 
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 Backing up this collaborative development effort are the licenses that accompany the 
code that enforce the community norm of openness.  The licenses do not reject copyright law but 
instead use the author’s copyright rights in the code to keep it open.65  The GPL, likely the most 
common FOSS license, is a case in point.66 Much open software is licensed under GPL v 2, first 
issued in 1991.67  After an extensive revision process, FSF released GPL v 3 in 2007.68
 
 The FSF took the position that GPL v 2 was not a contract.  In the words of Eben 
Moglen, the FSF’s attorney: 
 
The word ‘license’ has . . . a specific technical meaning in the law of property.  A license 
is a unilateral permission to use someone else’s property. . . . A contract, on the other 
hand, is an exchange of obligations, either of promises for promises or of promises of 
future performance for present performance or payment. . . . The GPL . . . is a true 
copyright license: a unilateral permission, in which no obligations are reciprocally 
required by the licensor.  Copyright holders of computer programs are given, by the 
Copyright Act, exclusive right[s] to copy, modify, and redistribute their programs.  The 
 
highly parallel and relatively unstructured way.”); see also Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on 
Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open Source Software, 9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. 
L. 45, 69-97 (2006) (“The open source movement has been fairly successful in the development 
of operating systems and server application systems that respond directly to the needs of 
sophisticated users, but they have been much less successful in developing end-user applications.  
Casual observation suggests that [F]OSS is now largely aimed at sophisticated users.  This 
targeting may be explained by the fact that [F]OSS programmers are seeking recognition from 
their peers, who are sophisticated users”); infra notes   , and accompanying text. 
 
65 See Weber, supra note 4, at 84 (“[O]pen source developers are some of the most 
vehement defenders of intellectual property rights.  Rarely do these developers put their software 
in the public domain, which means renouncing copyright and allowing anyone to do anything 
with their work.”); see also text accompanying note 4. 
66 See Davidson & Kumagai, supra note , at 137 & n. 16 (“[T]he GPL license covers a 
solid majority of open source software.  According to one source, around two-thirds of all open 
source projects use the GPL.”); Kumar, supra note , at 1 & n. 14 (“Between sixty-five and 
seventy percent of open source software is GPL[Version 2]-licensed.”). 
67 Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0, 24 No. 11 The 
Computer & Internet Lawyer 15, 15 (2007) (“Stallman released version 2 of the GPL (GPL 2.0) 
in 1991 after receiving some input from programmers and legal counsel.”). 
68 Id. (describing the revision process); Sapna Kumar & Olaf Koglin, GPL Version 3's 
DRM and Patent Clauses under German and U.S. Law, Cri 2/2008, 33, 33 (noting GPL v 3 was 
released on June 29, 2007). 
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GPL, reduced to its essence, says: “You may copy, modify and redistribute this software, 
whether modified or unmodified, freely.  But if you redistribute it, in modified or 
unmodified form, your permission extends only to distribution under the terms of this 
license.  If you violate the terms of this license, all permission is withdrawn.69  
 
Richard Stallman has also noted policy reasons why FSF prefers that copyright law rather than 
contract law govern the GPL: “Copyright law is . . .  would require every distributor to get a 
user’s formal assent to the contract before providing a copy.  To hand someone a CD without 
getting his signature first would be forbidden.  What a pain in the neck!”70  Additionally, 
copyright law offers the advantage of injunctive relief and contract law has worrisome privity 
limitations that may make remote enforcement of the GPL’s provisions difficult.71
 
 Sapna Kumar has characterized GPL v 2 as a “failed contract” because it “lacks a 
meeting of the minds with regard to consideration.”72  Although contract law does not require a 
“meeting of the minds” and formation issues are analytically distinct from the question of 
consideration, Kumar is rightly concerned that software users do not always have adequate 
notice of the license such that contract law would not recognize the formation of a contract.73  
Another commentator adds that “the licensee’s consideration is his promise to abide by the 
copyleft clause,” but notes that the user may not see the terms of use so that no contract is 
formed.74  Of course, these observations do not mean that contract law does not apply to open 
 
69 The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn’t Falling, available at 
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20031214210634851 (last visited Jan. 17, 2009) 
(quoting Moglen). 
70 Richard M. Stallman, Don’t Let ‘Intellectual Property’ Twist Your Ethos, June 9, 2006, 
available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/no-ip-ethos.html.  
71  On injunctions, see 17 U.S.C. 502 (authorizing injunctions in copyright cases); see 
also Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007).  On privity issues, see 
McGowan, supra note , at 297-98 (“GPL may not bind downstream users who take code from 
someone other than the rights-holder because persons who encounter license terms that run with 
thte code will not be in privity with the rights holder. . . . The privity concern might not be 
dispostive in any event.  The GPL is a nonexclusive, transferable license . . . .  One might view 
distribution of GPL code as simply a atranfer within the termjs of a license . . . .”). 
72 Kumar, supra note 2,  at 16. 
73 Id. at 17-19. 
74 Gonzalez, supra note  , at 200 (stating, “The vulnerabilities of the . . . GPL licensing 
method are: (1) the recipient of the software may not receive a notice of the license before 
delivery, and (2) no signature or other manifestation of assent is generally required.  Moreover . . 
. the recipient may not get a copy, physical or digital, of the . . . GPL license”). 
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source licenses, only that contract law will not enforce licenses without sufficient notice and 
assent. 
 
 For a time, the FSF insisted, as it had with GPL v 2, that v 3 is not a contract: However, it 
deleted language to that effect in the final wording of GPL v 3.75  GPL v 3 deals with a number 
of issues that arose over time in the licensing of open source software.76 For example, GPL v 3 
requires licensees to license essential patents to downstream users.77  Kumar states, 
 
It appears most likely that [breach of contract] is how GPLv3 will be enforced in the U.S.  
Unlike with GPLv2, a licensee under [v 3] has a number of affirmative obligations, such 
as providing a license on essential patents to all downstream users.  Such obligations 
cannot be enforced by the Copyright Act alone; a state contract action would also be 
required.78
 
 Courts, of course, will ultimately determine whether GPL v 2, v 3, or open source 
licenses generally are contracts.  In Germany where consideration is not required for a contract to 
be enforceable, courts treat GPL v 2 as both a contract and license.79  The most important U.S. 
case to date is Jacobsen v. Katzer which addressed not the GPL but another open source license 
called the Artistic License.80
  
 In Jacobsen, the defendant failed to comply with a number of provisions of the Artistic 
License: 
 
Specifically, [Katzer’s] software did not include (1) the author’s names, (2) [] copyright 
notices, (3) references to the COPYING file [which contains the Artistic License], (4) an 
identification of [Jacobsen] as the original source of the definition files, and (5) a 
description of how the files or computer code had been changed from the original source 
code.  The [Katzer] software also changed various computer file names . . . without 
 
75 Raymond T. Nimmer, Law of Computer Technology, § 11:19 (“. . . GPL 3.0 retains the 
general sense that the transactions it governs directly are noncontractual, although in the final 
draft after a lengthy revision process, the drafters deleted language specifying that the license 
was not a contract.”). 
76 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note , at 15-20.  
77 Id. at 17-19; Kumar, GPL Version 3, supra note  , at 33, 35-37 (discussing GPL v 3's 
patent provisions). 
78  Id. at 33. 
79 Id. at 33-34. 
80 535 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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providing a reference to the original files or information on where to get the [s]tandard 
[v]ersion.81
 
The district court held that Jacobsen’s cause of action was for breach of contract not copyright 
infringement, holding that the terms Katzer violated were not limitations on the scope of the 
license (and thus remediable under copyright law) but contractual in nature.82
 
 The Federal Circuit’s decision on appeal is noteworthy for two reasons - (1) its 
commentary on consideration; and (2) its holding that demonstrates the utility of both contract 
and copyright law in enforcing open source licenses.  We concentrate here on the first and turn to 
the second in Part III below.  With respect to consideration, the court stated: 
 
Traditionally, copyright owners sold their copyrighted material in exchange for money. 
The lack of money changing hands in open source licensing should not be presumed to 
mean that there is no economic consideration, however. There are substantial benefits, 
including economic benefits, to the creation and distribution of copyrighted works under 
public licenses that range far beyond traditional license royalties. For example, program 
creators may generate market share for their programs by providing certain components 
free of charge. Similarly, a programmer or company may increase its national or 
international reputation by incubating open source projects. Improvement to a product 
can come rapidly and free of charge from an expert not even known to the copyright 
holder.83 
 
The court thus appeared to recognize that the Artistic License was supported by consideration 
and a contract.  
 
 B.  Most Open Source Licenses Are Contracts 
 
 We believe that the Jacobsen court’s decision is correct.  We also think that although 
there are a range of open source licenses, most contain terms that should place them within 
contract law’s domain and lack of consideration should not prevent these licenses from being 
 
81 Id. at 1376-77. 
82 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 2007 WL 2358628, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
83 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1379. (“The Eleventh Circuit has recognized the economic 
motives inherent in public licenses, even where profit is not immediate. See Planetary Motion, 
Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1200 (11th Cir.2001) (Program creator “derived value 
from the distribution [under a public license] because he was able to improve his Software based 
on suggestions sent by end-users.... It is logical that as the Software improved, more end-users 
used his Software, thereby increasing [the programmer's] recognition in his profession and the 
likelihood that the Software would be improved even further.”)”. 
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treated as contracts.84  Here we clarify and elaborate on the type of terms that should do so.  For 
example, and most obviously, contract law applies to the license if a licensee pays for the 
software or agrees to pay for maintenance or integration services.  Contract law should also 
apply  if the licensor and licensee exchange source code.  These transactions mirror the twentieth 
century exchange of hard goods for money or other consideration. 
 
 More challenging are open source licenses that do not contemplate any of the above 
exchanges, but simply authorize licensees to transfer, copy, or modify the software, subject to 
certain conditions.  Such “terms of use” often include (and we focus on)  the “copyleft” and 
“same terms” provisions discussed earlier.85 These terms should also constitute consideration 
under the bargain theory.  Recall that general contract law court finds consideration if a condition 
constitutes more than is necessary to transfer a gift.86  Terms of use, such as “copyleft” and 
“same terms” are not necessary to convey software and therefore constitute consideration under 
general contract law if at least part of the vendor’s motive (however insubstantial), judged 
objectively, is to extract agreement to the terms of use.87  Vendors in the open source movement 
make no secret about their desire to create a new paradigm of openness, to enhance the freedom 
and capabilities of software users, to foster innovation, and to create public acceptance and 
familiarity with their intellectual property framework.88  The motive to further one or more of 
these goals, without more, should be sufficient to satisfy the bargain requirement.  But often 
there is more.  A licensor may benefit indirectly, for example, by entering lucrative service and 
 
84  See Matthew D. Stein, Rethinking UCITA: Lessons from the Open Source Movement,  
58 Maine L. Rev. 157 (2006) (discussing the range of licenses).  As of 2006, there were “nearly 
sixty separate licenses approved by the Open Source Initiative.”  Id. at 196. 
85  See supra notes , and accompanying text. 
86 See Plowman v. Indian Refining Co., 20 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Ill. 1937) (retired 
employees’ trip to employer’s office to receive their pay not consideration); Affiliated 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 259-260 (Del. 1939) (distinguishing “mere incidental or 
friendly detriments, not intended as ingredients of a bargain” from “bargained-for 
consideration.”).  
87   For a discussion of the position that open source software demands special legal 
treatment, see Jean Braucher, New Basics: 12 Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market 
Software and Other Digital Products, working paper, May 27, 2005.  For another view, see Ieuan 
G. Mahoney & Edward J. Naughton, Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the Bazaar and 
into Big Business, 21 N. 10 Computer & Internet L. 1, 1 (2004) (“The open source movement 
may have been born as a political ideology, a communitarian alternative to corporate profit 
seeking and the ‘privatization’ of technical innovation, but it has been transformed into a 
commercial enterprise.”). 
88  See supra notes , and accompanying text. 
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update contracts or by gaining publicity for other more entrepreneurial  projects.89  Even without 
such benefits, collaborators work in a “gift culture in which members compete for status by 
giving things away.”90  Contract law (like the court’s ruling in Jacobsen) long has recognized 
that a motive to increase one’s standing as opposed to pure altruism may be sufficient to 
constitute consideration.9   1 Further, developers learn state-of the-art technology and “build their 
reputation[s]” by participating in the open source movement.92  Thus, consideration supports 
open source software license grants under traditional contract law.93
 
But what of Moglen’s objection that an open source license is no different from, for 
example, an invitation (license) to visit an owner’s land?94  The implication of this observation is 
that even if the invitation includes restrictions, concerning, for example, the time of the visit or 
permitted uses of the land, the restrictions simply define and narrow the scope of the license, 
which should not be treated as a contract if a contract requires a promisor to extract something 
from the promisee. Open source licenses that contain “copyleft” or “same terms” restrictions, 
however, go beyond simply defining the boundaries of the license.  If the landowner required the 
 
89  See Jacobsen, supra note ; Weber, supra note 4, at   . 
90  Jyh-An Lee, supra note , at 55. 
91  See, e.g., Allegheny College, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
92  Weber, supra note 4, at     . 
93  See Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual 
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1545, 1597 (2006) (“[B]y clicking that 
she has accepted [the] EULA from KaZaa, bundled with [spyware], the user has ostensibly 
struck a bargain.  She will receive a program she sought for “free.”  Of course, ‘[i]n a sense, 
[she] is paying, but the coin is privacy, not money.’”) (quoting Paul M. Schwartz, Property, 
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055, 2072 (2004), quoting Cade Metz, Spyware–
It’s Lurking on Your Machine, PC Mag., Apr. 22, 2003, at M7); Matthew D. Stein, Rethinking 
UCITA: Lessons From the Open Source Movement, 58 Me. L. Rev. 157, 194 (2006) (“The GPL 
. . . is not just a mere permission.  It imposes obligations upon licensees that must be accepted in 
order to exercise the rights granted in the license. . . . Given these obligations, many have 
suggested that the GPL would likely be intepreted as a contract, not a bare license.”) 
 
 Additional helpful commentary includes Matthew D. Stein, Rethinking UCITA: Lessons 
From the Open Source Movement, 58 Me. L. Rev. 157 (2006); Jonathan Zittrain, Normative 
Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 265 (2004); 
Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 759 (1999); Margaret J. Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private 
Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 195 (1998). 
94  See supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
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invitee to use knowledge gained by the visit in a special way or restricted the transfer of that 
knowledge to a third party, then the license to visit the land would constitute a bargain and a 
contract under traditional contract law. 
 
 Moreover, as we developed in Part I, contract law has evolved to find consideration when 
enforcement of promises would increase society’s welfare and the enforcement is capable of 
judicial administration.95 The social value of the FOSS movement is unquestionable. We have 
already noted that many of the most important and complex software programs are open source 
and private companies have embraced the model.96  Further, without doubt open source has 
achieved its goal of fostering innovation that makes more and more programs available to the 
public, often for free.97  In addition, the open source philosophy has spread to other frameworks, 
increasing people’s “access to knowledge” in a wide variety of settings.98  Finally, the 
collaborative model arguably promotes better quality and reliable software in large part because 
skilled  participants have the luxury of ample time to devote to software development99 and 
without fear of a lawsuit based on copyright or another intellectual property cause of action.100  
 
95 See supra notes , and accompanying text; see also Wessman, supra note , at 14 
(observing “the trend in modern contract law to enforce all commercial promises–even though 
some are technically gratuitous”). 
96  See supra notes , and accompanying text; see also Ken Coar, Open Standards 
Requirements for Software–Rationale, Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/osr-
rationale (“As the Internet shows so clearly, there is great social, technical, and financial benefit 
that comes from massive interoperability.”).  
97  Free distribution means that collaborators have no to privatize their creations.  The 
Open Source Definition, Version 1.8, § 1 Rationale. 
98  See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note    (situating the open source software movement 
within a wider “access to knowledge” movement and tracing the open source software regime as 
a reaction to the strength of intellectual property rights); see also Mark J. Jakiela, 
http://law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?id=6381 (websites incorporate contributions to content such 
as T-shirt graphic design); Charles McManis, Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing under the 
new FAO Treaty: The Interface of Open source and Proprietary Agricultural Innovation, 
http://law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?id=6381 (international treaty dealing with plant genetics 
parallels open source and proprietary software interface); Keith Sawyer, 
http://law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?id=6381 (discussing “collaborative webs”). 
99  Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar   (1977) (“closed-source world cannot 
win an evolutionary arms race with open-source communities that can put orders of magnitude 
more skilled time into a problem”);  J. T. Westermeier, Open Source Software, Practicing Law 
Institute for Intellectual Property Law 425, 427-40 (2004). 
100  Coar, supra note    . 
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 Not only does open source benefit society, but courts should have little difficulty 
applying a contractual framework to open source licenses. We have already shown that open 
source meets the technical requirements of a bargain.  We now set forth another example of how 
open source nicely lends itself to a contract-law analysis. 
 
 Even if an open source license is supported by consideration and the licensee has 
reasonable notice of the terms, a licensor might argue that there is no binding contract until the 
licensee modifies or distributes the software for two reasons.  First, a court might find that the 
contract lacks mutuality of obligation–the licensee can choose not to modify or distribute the 
software and therefore have no obligation under the license. Agreements that do not evidence a 
commitment from both parties are not enforceable as contracts.101   Second, a court might 
determine that the licensor made an offer for a unilateral contract–“if you modify or distribute 
the software, I promise not to sue you for infringement provided you abide by the 
restrictions.”102  The licensee has not accepted the offer until the licensee modifies or distributes 
the software. 
 
 The better view, however, is that a contract is formed when a licensee acquires the 
software, such as by downloading it, even if the licensee does not have to manifest assent to the 
restrictions and even before the licensee modifies or distributes the software.  The act of 
acquiring the software (assuming the licensee has knowledge of the restrictions) constitutes an 
implied-in-fact acceptance of the terms of use. At that point, the licensee has made a 
commitment that narrows its freedom, namely to abide by the restrictions if it modifies or 
distributes the downloaded software.103    
 
III.   Open Source Licenses Should be Treated as Contracts 
 
 As we have discussed, under the technical rules of consideration doctrine as it has 
developed, most open source licenses are supported by consideration.  Here we turn to broader 
policy questions and argue that open source licences nicely fit into the category of promises that 
contract law should enforce. 
 
 In short, clarifying the law applicable to open source licenses through enforcement of the 
licenses as contracts should help to facilitate and encourage open source development.  As we 
 
101  See, e.g., De Los Santos v. Great Western Sugar Co., 348 N.W.2d 842 (Nebraska 
1984). 
102 See generally Mark Pettit, Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. l. Rev. 551 (1983). 
103  If the court finds that the license is an enforceable contract even before the licensee 
modifies or transfers the software than the licensee would have warranty rights unless those were 
disclaimed.  
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noted in Part II, no one should dispute the social utility of open source software development.104  
As a practical matter, however, as vendors market more and more open source software 
commercially, disputes will arise.  By providing a framework for adjudication that respects the 
structure of the movement and (as we will shortly show) the importance of intellectual property 
law to it, contract law provides a measure of certainty that will prevent the inevitable disputes 
from undermining the movement. 
 
 We have noted that some open source proponents adamantly oppose the contract 
conception in part because of fears about formation requirements, privity rules, and the lack of 
injunctive relief (in contrast to copyright law).105  We have problems understanding these fears.  
First, the benefits of a contractual framework for open source distributors outweigh these 
concerns even if they were well-founded.  If open source licenses are not contracts, licensors 
more likely would be liable for defective software or intellectual property infringement than if 
they can disclaim liability in an enforceable contract.106  In fact, under a contract model, even 
without a disclaimer, open source vendors are not likely to be liable for breach of warranty such 
as UCC § 2-314's implied warranty of merchantability that applies to “professional[s] in 
business.”107  Hobbyists, by definition, are not in the software business and do not “deal in 
software of the kind transferred” or hold themselves out “by . . . occupation as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar” to the software.”108   The hobbyist’s “occupation,” again by 
definition, is not engineering the software.  Further, vendors of open source software that do not 
qualify as hobbyists often should have little to fear from contract warranty law as well because 
the nature of open source software development–multiple collaborators who often exchange code 
of software still in development--means that users should reasonably expect that the licensor is 
transferring the software “as is.”109
 
 Moreover, the fears of contract opponents are not well founded.  Although under current 
practices open source licenses rarely satisfy the notice and formation requirement of contract-
formation law (that Stallman rather improvidently considers a “pain in the neck”),110 these would 
 
104  See supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
105  See supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
106  Current law is unclear.  See, e.g., Herkko Hietanen, A License or a Contract; 
Analyzing the Nature of Creative Commons Licenses (2008), available at SSRN 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1029366 
107  UCC § 2-104 (1), cmt. 2 
108  See UCC § 2-104 (1) (emphasis supplied). 
109  See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, Chapter 3, 
Summary Overview (Proposed Final Draft May 2009) (hereinafter “ALI Principles”).   
110  See supra notes   , and accompanying text. 
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not be difficult to satisfy.  Courts generally approve of the clickwrap formation process for 
software downloads that requires for enforcement that a licensee click “I agree” at the end of or 
adjacent to an e-standard form before completing a transaction.111  Under current technology, 
moving to clickwrap should not prove costly to open source transactors, nor would attaching 
terms of use to packaged software.112
 
 Another important reason for recognizing open source licenses as contracts is that 
contract and intellectual property laws (we focus on copyright here) work well together in 
supporting the FOSS model and provide a useful compliment of remedies for breach of a license. 
In fact, with this compliment of remedies, open source licensors should have no misgivings 
about the availability of injunctive relief or worry about the privity problems of contract law.  If 
a user breaches a term of the license, courts generally analyze whether the provision constitutes a 
condition defining the scope of a license or a mere promise (also called a covenant).113  If a 
licensee exceeds the scope of the license, under copyright law the licensor can enjoin the usage 
and privity issues are irrelevant.  If a licensee breaks a promise enforceable under contract law, 
the licensor can collect damages. Of course, exceeding the scope of a license may constitute  
infringement and a breach of contract, but a court may hold the contract breach preempted by 
copyright law.114 State law determines whether a provision is a condition or covenant or both.11   5
 
111  ALI Principles, supra note , Chapter 2, Topic 2, Summary Overview.   
112  Id. at § 2.02, cmt. f. 
113  Id. at § 3.11 & Rptrs. n. b. (setting forth the general rules and sources). 
114  See id. Whether a licensor could phrase its entire agreement as stating conditions on 
scope is unclear.  The benefit of this strategy for a licensor is that all breaches would be 
infringements so that the licensor could sue in federal court and receive injunctive relief under 
the Copyright Act.  Addressing this question is beyond the scope of this paper.  We argue, 
however, that there is no need for a licensor to engage in this strategy. Rather, a combined 
strategy of reliance on copyright and contract law can serve the FOSS community well. 
115  Courts may look to a variety of factors including the language of the license, course 
of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade, and other extrinsic evidence, and the 
placement of the term in the license. The Jacobsen court’s discussion which looks to the 
language of the agreement and the structure of the transaction is not atypical:  
 
The Artistic License states on its face that the document creates conditions: “The intent of 
this document is to state the conditions under which a Package may be copied.” 
(Emphasis added.) The Artistic License also uses the traditional language of conditions 
by noting that the rights to copy, modify, and distribute are granted “ provided that ” the 
conditions are met. Under California contract law, “provided that” typically denotes a 
condition. . . .  
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Under this framework, licensors have nothing to fear from contract law, but instead should prefer 
its application.    
  
   
Conclusion 
 
 Our fast-paced age of electronic agreements that ostensibly govern transactions as diverse 
as downloading software, ordering goods, and engaging in collaborative development projects  
raises questions regarding the suitability of contract law as the appropriate legal framework.  
While this question arises in many settings , we focused here on the free and open source 
software (FOSS) movement because of the maturity and success of its model and the ubiquity of 
its software.  We explored in particular whether open source licenses are supported by 
consideration, and argue that they are, and that open source licenses are contracts. We further 
argued that a contractual framework working in tandem with the intellectual property laws is the 
appropriate legal structure to govern FOSS transactions.  Our discussion holds implications for 
the understanding of consideration doctrine and contract law generally outside of the FOSS 
example and, indeed, for collaborative development and electronic agreements generally.  
 
The conditions set forth in the Artistic License are vital to enable the copyright holder to 
retain the ability to benefit from the work of downstream users. By requiring that users 
who modify or distribute the copyrighted material retain the reference to the original 
source files, downstream users are directed to Jacobsen's website. Thus, downstream 
users know about the collaborative effort to improve and expand the SourceForge project 
once they learn of the “upstream” project from a “downstream” distribution, and they 
may join in that effort. 
 
The District Court interpreted the Artistic License to permit a user to “modify the 
material in any way” and did not find that any of the “provided that” limitations in the 
Artistic License served to limit this grant. The District Court's interpretation of the 
conditions of the Artistic License does not credit the explicit restrictions in the license 
that govern a downloader's right to modify and distribute the copyrighted work. The 
copyright holder here expressly stated the terms upon which the right to modify and 
distribute the material depended and invited direct contact if a downloader wished to 
negotiate other terms. These restrictions were both clear and necessary to accomplish the 
objectives of the open source licensing collaboration, including economic benefit. . . .  
 
Id. at 1381. 
